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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

s.

11270

NW. TURNER, Warden,
h State Pr is on, et al. ,

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Willie Folkes, appeals from an
.er denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
By order dated May 14,

1968, accompanied by Find- ,

s 0 £ Fact and Conclusions of Law, bearing the same

'

2

a, the trial court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
~'denied

appellant's petition for a writ of

eas corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the trial court's order
ying appellant 1 s petition for a writ of habeas
pus should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent State of Utah submits the followstatement of facts as being more consistent with
t

the record reveals.
For the sake of clarity a distinction is made in
following sequence of events between those facts

wn specifically from the transcript of the hearing
the subject case and those facts drawn from the render of the record.

the latter

11

R 11

•

The former will be marked

11

T 11

,

3

on

October 11, 1966, the appellant was released

arole from the Utah State Pr is on ( T. 6) •

On or

t April 3, 1967, while still on parole (T. 7),
appellant aided and abetted one Carol Ann Williams
:scape from the Utah State Mental Hospital at or
tt which time he was returned to and confined in

Utah State Prison (T.8).

The aforementioned aid-

and abetting resulted shortly thereafter in the

ll and conviction of the appellant in Orem City

rt, Utah (R.13).
Approximately three weeks following the appel- ·
t's reconfinement, appellant's parole was formally
~ed

(May 24, 1967)

(T.9).

Prior to said revoca-

nappellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
the Fourth Judicial District.

On July 25, 1967,

.lowing the hearing on said petition, the appellant

I

i

• 0 rdered

releised and his Orem City Court conviction1
!

4

~red

a nullity on the grounds that the Orem City

~lacked

proper jurisdiction to try the case (R.13).

The appellant was thereafter properly tried on
iary 24, 1968, in the Fourth Judicial District on

aforementioned charge of aiding and abetting an
~pe

from the State Mental Hospital.

~d

in the conviction of appellant and an 80 day

son sentence.

The trial re-

This sentence was suspended, however,

the appellant released since appellant had already
n imprisoned in excess of 80 days as a result of
~ided

Orem City conviction (R.12,13).

On or about January 25, 1968, approximately one
after the appellant• s release, appellant allegedly
~lted

1, i2).

~

and battered his wife, breaking her jaw (R.11;;
On February 8, 1968, the appellant was re-

ned to the Utah State Prison, and on February 21,

B, appellant• s ·parole was formally revoked by the

'I

5

d of pardons

(T.13).

It is not clear from the

rd to what degree this alleged assault and bat-

was considered by the board, since the board
,gnized that there had been neither a trial nor a

'let.ion on the alleged assault and battery (R.11).
~s

there an admission of guilt before the board

te appellant (R.11).
:i:lg, however,

At the time of the board's

the appellant's conviction in the

Judicial District was specifically referred to

~h

;rounds for revocation (R.11).

The appellant petitioned a second time for rese on a writ of habeas corpus, on this occasion in
T!1ird Judie ial District.
~O\.\t

Said petition was heard

a jury on the 25th day of April, 1968, before

rWnorable Joseph G. Jeppson.

The plaintiff ap-

red in person and was represented by Robert Van
\7€[,

Attorney at Law.

The defendant, John W. Turner,,

6
en, Utah State Prison, was represented by LeRoy

nd, Assistant Attorney General.

s.

Pursuant to this

·ing, the appellant's petition was denied on May
~68
1

(R.14).

An appeal from denial of the peti-

was filed by appellant on May 20, 1968.
The remainder of the respondent's statement of

:s is in essence a summation of the transcript of
trial court whose judgment is the object of this

eal.

It is of necessity repetitive in part as to

ters of testimony.

During the hearing of April 25, 1968, Mr. Axland,
nney for the plaintiff,

initially moved for dis-

5al on the grounds that there was at that time
ling before the Utah Supreme Court, an appeal on

afurementioned conviction of the appellant in the
r~ Judicial District

ivn Lo dismiss

(t.3).

The court denied the

( T. 5) , presumably on the basis, as

7
:ed by the attorney for appellant,
181

that "this peti-

for writ of Habeas Corpus does not seek to

iew the conviction, but seeks to review the hold

:h has been adjudicated through the Board of Pardons,
llting in his confinement at the Utah State Prison.

3).

11

The question remained before the court as to

tter or not the parole of appellant was properly
minated (T.5).

Mr. Lawrence Morris, Executive Secretary of the
hState Board of Pardons was thereupon called as
itness on behalf of the appellant.

1

The witness

tified on direct examination, that "upon receipt
the parole violation report submitted by the Adult
bat ion and Parole Department, the Board issued a

·rant ordering Mr. (Willie) Folkes returned to prison
· :or him to be scheduled at the next meeting of
board for a parole violation.

11

(T.8).

The witness

.;

8

r tcstif ied that "the Board reviewed the inforo:-i they had; they revoked the parole of Mr. Folkes
.. " (T.9), the effective date of revocation being
24, 1967.

The information referred to by the

.ess and as submitted by the Adult Probation and
1le Department was specifically the conviction of

!llant in Orem City Court.

The witness further

::..fied that following said hearing and revocation

larole the Board received an order dated July 25,
1, signed by the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge,
tth Judicial District ordering the release of the

:lla,1t, and ·that
l

11

based upon the fact the convic-

had been set aside,

or; parole.

they (the board) reinstated

We heard nothing further from the mat.-

until he was convicted in the Fourth Judicial Dis'~ C
·01.<.rt on the charge. I '

(T.9,10).

Upon further questioning by the attorney for

9

J:::..fL .Mr. Morris testified that "some time shortly

c:o February 21, 1968, the Board was again advised
;;,e Aciult Probation and Parole Department (that)
;:il:"'c:s had been convicted in Fourth Judicial Dis:t court, and that he was involved in the assault
~s

former wife on January 25, 1968.

1 ~n£orrnation,
;,~s

the Board again issued a warrant

return • • • • 11

r:..2ry 9, 1968.

Based upon

(

T .10) which was executed

A second parole violation hearing

,,t:lO. on April 25,

1968.

A photo copy of the trans-

p::')n of said parole violation hearing was entered·
P~o.ir1tiff 1 s exhibit# 1

(T.10, R.11).

Pertinent

L::s of this transcript were read into the record

b: subject habeas corpus hearing,

:!:

in particular,

:::.tement of George Latimer, chairman and one of
~::eEO

members of the Board.

11

•••

we have signed

<: :c,1dicating your (appellant's) wife suffered

'.
'.

10
~sn

jaw, and whether you did it or not is some-

as else.
t 1me

we have no conviction on that, so for

being, we will consider the first one refer-

J to the conviction (in the Fourth Judicial District)
the aiding and abetting question.

11

During further examination of Mr. Morris by the
orney for the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Van Seiver
td:

Q.

Now do you have an opinion of the

reason why Mr. Folkes was revoked by the

Board of Pardons, the second time?

A.

Again, I would have to state my opin-

ion was the board apparently construed the

conviction as a serious enough violation
to return him to the institution
Dliting

(T.12).

the cross examination of Mr. Morris by Mr.

lr,:, it was established that Mr. Morris was an

11
ir::.st.cative officer, not a member of the Board of
dc:is and therefore had no "controlling voice in
oJtcoma

of a parole revocation hearing • • • • 11

14).
Q.

(Mr. Ax land)

So you do not know then,

do you, what went through the minds of

these voting member? (T.14).
A.

(Mr. Morr is)

l1r. Lou Bertram,
11cn

No, sir.
an agent with the Adult Pro-

and Parole Department, was called as the second

ttc two witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff-appellt ar.d

testified that in this parole-parolee relation-.

lp '·1ith the appellant he had on two separate occasionf!;
l

r.:ested that the appellant be brought before the
In both instances the bas is for his request

tr~.
1

:~;formation of a criminal conviction of the appel-

It.

-,

::owever, the testimony leaves some doubt as to

1

: i

12

.-p.:::::ran.

1

s precise information with regard to his

nc. :--::quest to the board

(Mr. Van Seiver)

( T .17) •
• • • did you not

.cec:;uest he be revoked later on the Orem
C:i.ty

.....

conviction, the first time?
I requested a warrant be issued and

returned to the Utah State Prison for a
;arole violation hearing •

"'

. . • That was the basis of the ini-

, i:ial request, was it not?
.-..

Yes.

'..:.

The action taken by the Orem City

'·

Was that not the same basis you made

~:;2

:request in the second?

···

Yes.

13
>e:spondent submits that since the power to ree~

parole rests solely with the Board of Pardons

point of law to be discussed subsequently), and
.t since from the record of the subject hearing the
~recognized

that the Orem City conviction had been

1iifled prior to its second hearing on appellant's

:ole violation (see R.11),

it then follows that Mr.

rtram' s answer as to the basis for the second re1st (stated above)

is irrelevant, if correct.

Both plaint if £-appellant and the State rested

hr cases at this juncture.
lie~
I

The court thereupon

plaint if £-appellant's motion for relief under

writ of habeas corpus.

'ihe trial court acknowledged the Orem City contt~on as a nullity (R.13), but found as a conclu&r: 0 £

I
I

.l
~

law that there had been no double jeopardy

lE~::. as the result of the second trial and conviction J

14
1968, in the Fourth Judicial District

f :;a;1ua:ry 24,

The court further found that the conviction

~.l3).

1968, constituted a violation of plain-

f January 24,
~:£-appellant

1

s executed parole agreement, this

es;;;ite the fact that the conviction resulted in a
uspended sentence

( R .13, 14) •
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE BOARD OF PARDONS ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF

n's AUTHORITY IN REVOKING THE APPELLANT Is PAROLE.
I

FJ:.:.:-i CODE ANN • §

7 7 -6 2 -1 7

( 19 5 3 ) •

With regard to the historical development and
IEE c~

parole, attention is drawn to a leading article=

r: '-:1e subject of the revocation of conditional libert
ir.

~articular,

t· (h-

'•.v<::

to what protections, if any, circum-

its revocation.
'

Due Process and Revocation of

"'· .c;:-,dit1onal Liberty, 12 Wayne Law Review, 638-656
'

~

15

. _,,
)

~s

In this article it is stated that of the

1.) ; •

i:- 26 cypes of conditional releases,

and conditional pardon, the use of parole

·:~c.cion
:

:~1 e

1vcr

i.e., parole,

states as well as in the federal system has
existed without enabling legislation.

lf:_doni, 263 Mich. 295, 248 N.W. 627 (1933).
i

People v.
Nor

sc:ch legislation authorizing the grant of condi-

ic:::;l liberty cons ti tu tionally compelled.
._~-"."',strong,
~-

208 U.S. 481 (1908);

Ughbanks

People v. Bendoni,'1

Statutes providing for post-conviction parole

tcc2dures

may be characterized as acts of grace by

he;"cate, Burris v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932)
~v.

Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (1960); Woodward v.:

~I 124 Ind. 439, 24 N.E. 1047 (1890).

Such

k,:t2s are typically phrased in broad discretionary

l:_~~cg2.

•i'

18

u.s.c.

(1953).

§ 4203

(1948); Utah Code Ann. §

Moreover, the determination of

16
. . :.c:c.h 8 r or: not to grant conditional liberty is solely
~·:::-. 1 :-i

the power of the appointed authorities, whose

ac::::.sion involves "a discretionary assessment • • .
,\o::l what
s~::?lY

what he has done.

11

Kadish, The Advocate and

r:xpert - Counsel in the Peno - Correctional Proce

"::2
~:.

a man is and what he may become rather than

:'iinn. L. Rev.

813 ( 1961).

It appears that the appellant bases his appeal
le:. an alleged denial of due process and equal protec'~~c,~.

of the law.

1.
:s~,ed

Specifically:

It is alleged that appellant was twice pun~.'

for the same crime.
2.

It is alleged that appellant was not advise

~llie right to have benefit of counsel during the
~~cation proceedings against him,

nor was he repre-

~i:~.~e::J. by counsel at his hearing before the Board of
;

J;~:;::i1s.

17
It is alleged that appellant's parole
'

; ,.~lawfully revoked in that said revocation lacked
; ;.::sis other than a mere whim of the Board of

T:-ie respondent denies any violation of due pro-

'

~~:equal

protection of the law in all matters

ie\'c.r.t to appellant 1 s cause.
I

In answer to the matter of alleged double

i

J.•

r

i::o[dy, respondent refers to the first conclusion
l~·,.;

as made and entered by the Third Judicial Dis-

k: Court of trial,

islding.
i~~rdy

the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppsen

"That there has in fact been no double

raised against this petitioner in that the

h:proceeding in Orem City was declared on or about

1,

'

" -

~J,

1967, by the Honorable Allen Sorenson, dis-

':·:·- JUClge
'.'
of the Fourth Judicial District, to be a

I

l·--~.
-.. " ( R.3 ) •

Respondent asks that the trial court

18
,.. -' ~ra.ined
in its judgment on this issue •
--

2.

In answer to the question of whether or not

oe~J.c.nt
:~.:~

has the right to be represented by counsel

parole revocation proceedings or to what degree,

c.:~/,

there exists a duty of the Board so to advise

pt~l.ant

~·ic.ynE:

of such right, respondent against refers to
Law Review 652-654 ( 1966) which specifically

bsses this issue and its various treatment,

. the states are further restricted by the equal protection
clause. This constitutional right
is significant in those states assigning different rights in revocation proceedings involving different
types of conditional liberty. Inasmuch as the types of conditional
liberty are different in name and
derivation only, and have the same
substantive characteristics, legislation allowing counsel in probation
revocation hearings but not parole
revocation hearings arguably would
be a denial of equal protection to
the parolee • • • •

19
There would appear to be no reason for a difference in the protection of the rights granted a
parolee as distinguished from
those granted a probationer. Without such reason, legislation establishing such dichotomy might be
considered arbitrary and violative
of equal protection.
The strongest case for the application of equal protection involves
the indigent defendant. Most statutes allowing for counsel at revocation hearings limit such right to
~ounsel of one's own choice', i.e.,
M.ich. Comp. Laws § 791. 240 ( 1948) ,
Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 28~2310 (1954).
The equal protection argument has
been dismissed on the theory that
G-idPOD v. Woinwrjgbj:.., 372 U.S. 335
(1963) which established the right
to appointed counsel at felony trials
and Massiah v. United. States, 377 U.
S. 201 (1964) extending this right
to all stages of the criminal proceedings, are inapplicable to revocation hearings, which are not criminal prosecutions. Jones v. Rivers,
338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964). However, Chief Judge Sobeloff, in a
concurring opinion, at 876, suggests
that distinctions between indigents

20

and those with means is not warranted in view of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) . • •
(the) argument that counsel must
be provided to an indigent probationer or parolee is not based on
a theory that a revocation hearing
is a criminal prosecution.
It
merely rests on the proposition
that where a statute provides for
counsel of one's choice, a prisoner
unable to hire private counsel has
a right to have counsel appointed.
Hoffman v~ State, 404 P.2d 644
(Alaska 1965). In other words,
the argument recognizes that a
state need not make any provision
for counsel at revocation hearings
since Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S.
490 (1935) obviates such requirement. However, if the state does
make such provision it must apply
to the indigent as well or constitute a denial of equal protection
of the laws.
In states granting a hearing
but not detailing the incidental
rights, the defendant is usually
entitled to present witnesses, crossexamine adverse witnesses, and obtain
the aid of counsel. States having
no explicit statutory provisions
•

o

o

21
referring to notice and hearing normally provide a hearing
although it is often just an
informal interview.
Thus, irrespective of the lack of constitutional compulsion, most
states provide those rights
associated with procedural due
process and considered fundamental to a deprivation of liberty.
Uta'.1

Code Ann. § 77-62-17 does not specifically

~:a

parolee right to a hearing prior to revoca-

1:. o:

parole.

: 0::.1inate

t
I

11

The Board of Pardons is empowered

at any time, the parole of any offender.

11

'-'·Harris, 108 U. 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945) states,
=.'.'1nciple that the Board has. power .to revoke parole

t:.jc;: affording prisoner any hearing.
:;:~v:lege
1:-;_

As a matter

but not right, Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16

.

· ' states that the "board of pardons shall permit

i ~.::::ender re imprisoned for parole violation to be

t~ :c

its next regular meeting."

Respondent submitsf

1

22

~~i ~ot
~>::
t~

providing for the right to a hearing it

tr.at the State of Utah is effectively removed

;.:.y question of equal protection under the laws,

e~:::~call.y
f=~~::.:.-:

t .. ~;; ...

with regard to the allegation of the

that he was unlawfully denied benefit of

·
p ar ol e revoca t ion
·
h earing.
·
1
a t ,,_
u:is

Respondent

a-:::2t s::.:i::ni ts that the laws of the State of Utah

-··- s'J.!::J ect appeal is factually and procedurally

from ~~erl'\Pa v. Rhay, 389 U .s. 128,
254 ( 1967), wherein the petitioner was
:: .. :..c::e6. o:: an of::ense upon a plea of guilty
1
::::":-2c, \:2. t~ the advise of court-appointed counsel·
:~.~ :'.'.e::::-eafter put on probation.
Sentence was de::::-~·22. a.cco:::::ding to Washington Law.
Subsequently,
:: '°- :-.ea.:c.:::..::-ig in wnich petitioner was not represente<
< .:::...::-.sel, -=he court revoked petitioner 1 s probac.:.C.. :;:;c.s sea. sentence. The Supreme Court of the ,
:::.:2 o:: ~·;ashington O.enied petition for writ of
:.::2::.s ccrpus, but the Supre::ie Court of the United
::::.-:e:.:o ::-eversed on writ of certiori, holding that
-. :.. :c.se ~~ere an accused agreed to plea guilty,
'~:.::_~;-. ::-.e ::ad a valid defense, because he was
=---:::::: ,?.::'.'o~atio:i., absence of counsel at the iinposi
--= :.;-.e C.e:::erred sentence might well result in I
"- : ::
-- ~--= t::-.e right to appeal.
:~s::..:-::;'J..:..shed

:: S. Ct.

:-=:.

~

~

23

1:ot place a duty on the Board of Pardons to

-c.r1e parolee of any right to counsel at his re-

1: 02

:2~1on

hearing in that (1) the code of criminal pro-

jc2 is silent on the matter,
1":2d 1

and ( 2) as previously

there exists no right, as such, to a revo-

~nhearing.

Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (1968)

1c1rc.; Williams v. Patterson,
t;, 2irc.; Gonzales v. Patterson,

389 F.2d 374 (1968)
3 70 F. 2d 94 ( 1966)

~' Circ.

3.

In answer to the appellant's claim that his

Jc~2 i·1as revoked at the whim of the Board of Pardons
! ~i1erefore lacked any proper basis, the respondent
the courts attention once again to the tran-

IE':s

k;:

of the trial court where in two possible bases

r ~2-id

revocation are recorded.

One is the alleged

~lt and battery of the appellant's wife.

The

t~ :ic=.J at the time of appellant's revocation hearing

24

._ o·~
!~:··-~

records indicating (his) wife suffered a broken
However, the Board apparently placed

II

f • • •

•

~:~e 1 f

any weight on this charge since they had

, .. no conviction on that.

11

(T.12).

As to the

to:.c possible basis for revocation, specifically
1~:p2llant

1

s conviction dated January 24, 1968, in

l?ou:th Judicial District Court, State of Utah, of
~ cci.me of aiding and abetting an escape from the
~.State Hospital
~

2s

(R.14), this is a matter of record

such is an irrefutable basis for revocation of

Furthermore, it is clear that at the time
1

a~?ellant s revocation hearing, the Board had
1

L:ic knowledge of said conviction and put great
,I

~~upon it as grounds for appellant's parole reta::o:, (R.11 t:. .~ec.ring).

the transcript of said parole violaRespondent maintains that it is clear

t ·-~·.e record. that the Board s consideration of
1

25
case and its subsequent decision to revoke
. .,

J.

1€~.:.::n~

IS

parole were not arbitrary or in any sense

1 rr:ar:J..festation

of mere whim.

Therefore, there was

viol2tion of due process by the Board of Pardons.

Ir.deed, an effective conditional liberty system
li:::;;.tely depends upon fair treatment of the parolee,

l ti:e

threat of arbitrary revocation does not en-

~ra;e or aid the process of rehabilitation of the
I

~Jtionally released prisoner.
I

~I
i

287 U. S • 216

l1·,·.l re L
t 1..

1

.i.

•

I

~c

( 19 3 2) ; 6 5 Harv. L. Rev. 3 09 ( 19 51:
The discretionary power of the·

is broad but not unlimited, and the reversal of

l

~·:ocation

'

~'

Rev. 650.

See Burns v. United

may be the result of its misuse.

Swan v.

200 Md. 420, 90 A.2d 690 (1952); United States

~De L 11 cie v. O'Donover, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D.
,. l948), affirmed,
I

~-,

178 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949),

340 U.S. 886 (1950).

Examples of abuse

·1

26
c:.

,ould call for revocation are "suspicion of

~=

11

i:c:.(..uct

not proven," United States v. Van Riper,

:.2d 816 (2nd Cir. 1938) wherein it is stated

the state normally bears the burden of

1: 2.lthough

~·._

.s a

violation,

'~egree

b.

"no probation statute specifies

of proof necessary to meet this burden."

L. Rev.

311, 332 (1959) as cited in 12 Wayne

i

i;ev. 651.

Normally, the evidence required to re-

k1s that which satisfies the judge; proof beyond
le"~:ma:Ole
I

doubt is not required.

Manning v. United

l

~, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1947); Blaylock v. State.
I

I

i·:~ ..;pp.

r;

L,

880, 78 S.E.2d 537 (1953), cited in 12

Rev. 651.

It is submitted that these limita-

'

h ::1ere

not violated by the trial court, and that

<::::ectly found no whim or caprice by the Board of

r~:o

l[l i tS revocation Of appellant IS parole•

~:-,e Law of Utah makes it clear that the Board of

27

,.~;:, 3

of the State of Utah is a constitutionally

ic~~:.s!1ed

body, Utah Const. art. 7, § 12, with
authority to remit fines and foreitures,

IC~~sive

and grant pardons after convicjr.S • •

P.~c

,

•

II

See also Cardico v. Davis, 91 U. 323,

216 ( 19 3 7) •

The statutes of this state grant

lr:cc:.rd of Pardons broad discretionary powers to

be paroles
~::.2rs

and re incarcerate parolees.

"All

released on parole, pursuant to the pro-

~~s hereof,

shall remain in the legal custody and

I

~: c.:ontrol of the chief adult parole and adult pro:..
L~officer,
rc:o.~en

and shall be subject at any time to

to the ins ti tut ion from which he was paroled

I~- ~'"en time as his sentence is terminated.

Full

~t0 retake and reimprison any convict upon parole
'

i'<·nred upon the board of pardons,
fr"- -

~:~<=rt if ied

whose written

by its secretary shall be sufficient

28

z_ ..·:: £or all officers authorized to make arrests,
:::::P-r persons named therein, to return to actual

r:cy
1·. I
,:~)

any such prisoner.

.

11

Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16

This statute is essentially a restatement

:: ?rinciple of law set out in McCoy v. Harris, 108
;jl,

160 P.2d 721 (1945) which states that "viola-

~of

rules for the conduct of a paroled prisoner

1

'

,:~::!ilar

to a violation of rules within the prison

I

':onstitutes an abuse of the privilege for which
, J:1vilege may be withdrawn, and the rules confer

l~~;al

right."
CONCLUSION

Tbe respondent maintains that on the basis of
I

'=~cts of this case,

the laws of this State, and

~:~:.:.ng continuum of the law of the United States,

1=~ cc.n

be little doubt that the Board of Pardons

~. ··"=ll

within the scope of its authority in re-

l-'
,. : tne parole of the appellant.
I

The respondent

29
i

J:;::Jre submits that the trial court's order deny~

.:.:]?dlant' s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

,dd be affirmed.
i
i

Respectfully submitted,
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